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Introduction
In India, 50% of children under five years of age are malnourished amidst a
yearly surplus in grain production. Approximately 40% of food is lost in transport on a
daily basis, yet the country has been able to prevent major famines for over 60 years. In a
country with a GDP of 8-9% and an ever-growing presence on the international economic
stage, these double standards cannot be tolerated. 260 million Indians live in extreme
poverty, and 40% of those depend mainly on agricultural labor. This sector accounts for
approximately 26% of India’s GDP, and provides employment for about 70% of the
workforce. Yet there is an agrarian crisis, with a collapse of employment growth, falling
export prices, and a rising spiral of farm debt 1 . Thus, in combating poverty, improving
food security, and maintaining influence in international forums, it is vital to both
stabilize and strengthen agriculture in the country. Growth in economic power also
signals the need for natural resource management and conservation. The negative effects
of the Green Revolution are already being felt by the nation’s farmers, and modernization
is taking its toll on access to water, power, and soil fertility. Therefore, strengthening the
agricultural sector implies an environmentally sustainable approach. However, “by
liberalizing agricultural trade, the depression in the global markets is being imported into
the Indian economy,” and thus pushing agriculture as an export market puts a fragile
industry and many fragile lives at risk 2 . In fact, it is argued that there is an inverse
relationship between a primary export thrust and domestic food availability. 3 With these
considerations in mind, a domestic market for organic food can positively affect the lives
of millions throughout India while maintain the rapid economic success of the nation.
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Access vs. Production
Perhaps the most highly contested issue concerning food security in India deals
with access and production. National level plans, especially that of the Tenth Plan, have
dealt specifically with improving inputs for farmers, and thus subsidizing several large
inputs like fertilizer and pesticides. However, these policies have not only been
detrimental to the environment by encouraging rapid and large scale mono-cropping and
ignoring agro-climactic diversity, but they have not fared well juxtaposed against the
reality of a massive grain surplus with insufficient storage and distribution. As well, it
has been determined that “even a modest reduction in these subsidies, say, to the extent
of 20% could enable the government to double its investment in agriculture.” 4 Therefore,
many organizations, international institutions, and farmers groups have encouraged a
focus on access to food. The micro-level food insecurity is seen as a problem of
infrastructure and corrupt systems of trade, which the government has taken an initiative
to combat with national programs. Yet these programs, as discussed shortly, are severely
limited in reaching those who need access to food the most. Thus, there must be another
option that reaches the hungry. Daniel Gustafson writes of the importance of smallholder
agriculture for both food security and poverty reduction:
“It is important not to confuse national self-sufficiency with food security. Since India
has long been self-sufficient in food but a large part of the population remains food
insecure, there is obviously more to the story. The second perspective that inadvertently
downplays the importance of agricultural production in the food security equation is the
belief that since national-level production per se is not a current problem, the main issues
of food security relate to access, particularly to the Public Distribution System and other
safety net programs. These have a crucial role to play but rural families’ own production
continues to play the primary role in providing access to food.” 5
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Thus, finding a way to encourage small scale production for self consumption as well as
creating a marketable surplus is vital for the future of many of the hungry poor in India.

Public Distribution System
Currently, the government of India, as well as international agencies such as the
United Nations World Food Programme, approach food insecurity with an initiative
called the Public Distribution System (PDS), which organizes the allocation of basic
staple foods to families based on their relative level below or above the poverty line.
However, in a country with such size, diversity, and infrastructure problems, such
centralized programs have proven ineffective in getting food to those who need it the
most. Fair price shops (FPS) are often the local level distributors of PDS food, but have
been found to abuse the system by charging PDS cardholders at a higher margin for
personal profit, holding poor hours and harassing customers. FPS licensees themselves
find obstacles to the PDS, as they are often denied access to credit to hold their shops
open, and are victims to inconsistent supply from the central distribution centers. 6
Although food subsidies in 2003-2004 totaled Rs. 270 billion 7 , each rupee of foodgrain to
the poor costs the government Rs. 4.27 8 , reflecting the inefficiency of such expenditures.
A surplus stock of 65million tones of foodgrain 9 implies two dominant concerns: first,
methods of distribution are severely lacking, and although the PDS has done some
successful work to alleviate such problems, the sheer vastness of the country creates
doubt in investing in one centralized program. Second, this excess is a sign of falling
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purchasing power by the poor, as farmers sell off their grain to the government at the
mandated Minimum Support Price only when the market does not capture their goods.
Purchasing power en masse has in fact decreased between 1990 and 2001, and so,
contrary to the typical policy reaction of many developed nations, India cannot simply
raise prices to deal with the surplus. 10 By recognizing the issue of purchasing power
rather than distribution concerns, the poor can use the market economy to their advantage
instead of relying on external sources of assistance. As one representative of the World
Food Programme mentioned, the concept of “charity” is new in India 11 , and the idea of
re-distribution of resources from the rich to the poor through public works is something
looked on with suspicion, and consequently, often abused. The executive director of one
NGO even commented as such when responding to the recent standard of preventing
international NGOs from maintaining a strong presence in the country: “India wants a
permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council, and so does not want to be seen
as a charity nation. For that reason I am all behind this standard.” 12
Therefore, a market based approach, where farmers are able to better gauge
demand while incorporating more sustainable practices, is an effective method of
increasing purchasing power for the farmer and thus establishing a consistent income that
could potentially lift many out of poverty.
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Organic Farming
Currently, approximately 60% of farming in India is naturally organic, as most
farmers are too poor to afford external inputs such as fertilizers and pesticides. 13
However, those farmers that can afford such inputs, which are heavily subsidized by the
government, are able to produce goods quickly and cheaply and have the distributive
capacity to reach the mandi more efficiently, thus pushing out the small farmer. Due to
lack of access to information on effective farming techniques, small farmers are often
presented with schemes of wonder fertilizers and pesticides, which small retailers push,
and after paying exorbitant rates for the inputs, farmers not only see smaller yields, but
their soil fertility is worsened. If farmers are educated on effective organic farming
practices, their production can rise while conserving natural resources such as water, on
which chemically fertilized crops rely heavily. Thus, “the sustainability of small farms
will depend on use of environmentally friendly energy and other inputs such as organic
fertilizers and choice of crops which adapt to agro-climatic strengths.” 14 Consequently,
better production will allow farming families to consume a greater proportion of their
own food and avoid issues of lack of sufficient income in a volatile food marketplace or
an often abused public distribution system. According to the National Centre for
Agricultural Economics and Policy Research, “the number of people farming in India is
not viable now,” 15 and so many young people are migrating into cities for employment
for at least some portion of the year. As well, the Green Revolution transformed farming
from extensive cultivation to intensive cultivation, thus cutting down labor. Because
12
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organic farming is often considered to be more labor intensive, it gives farmers and their
families the choice to migrate or remain with farming.
However, these positive aspects are inevitably balanced with negative effects,
uncertainties, and myths that have prevented many from pursuing this method of
agriculture. Interviews with farmers have revealed differing views on the effectiveness
of natural inputs, as yields appear to increase for fruits and vegetables, decrease with
cereals, and go down regardless of crop after the first year. Some farmers claim that
hybrid seeds are less economically viable because they must be bought every year, while
others say that they use less pesticides and water, so the costs balance out. Organic
manure can often contain seeds of weeds that can destroy crops, but chemical pesticides
destroy natural predators of pests and destroy the fertility of the soil. These confusions
are compounded by market strategies. For example, with respect to the diminishing
returns of fertilizer application, the economically optimal level is less than the technically
optimal output. Some people believe that the visual appeal of organic fruits and
vegetables increase with organic, while others claim that the produce looks unripe and
dirty. Finally, judging the increase in income by having organically certified products is
often difficult to weigh against simply using non-harmful techniques for the sake of
preserving land. These are just some examples of the reasons why organic agriculture
has not hit the mainstream in terms of determining the most effective and efficient forms
of production.
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The Morarka Foundation
Certain non-government organizations (NGOs) are investing in rural agricultural
communities, educating and supplying inputs for different methods of organic farming.
The Morarka Foundation, based out of Jaipur, Rajasthan, has invested in vermi-culture as
a livelihood for farmers throughout the region. These farmers use vermi-compost
(recycled natural waste decomposed by earthworms) as natural fertilizers for their crops,
as well as sources of income, as Morarka sells the largest amount of vermi-compost in the
world, and sources it from the farmers that it trains and supports. The foundation has
since created its own private firm to market organic certified products, recognizing the
potential for a lucrative market. As well, as Mukesh Gupta, the executive director of
Morarka has recognized, “small producers have a greater ability to comply with
quality/organic standards,” and so the small farmer, often ousted from traditional
markets, can find a niche in organic food production. 16 According to Morarka, the cost
of agriculture over the past decades has increased, making the sector as a whole
unprofitable. Thus, they are “converting agriculture into agri-business, which is more
economically viable and sustainable in the future.” 17 In previous national efforts, the
emphasis has been on increasing production as an improvement for the value chain, but
that does not necessarily result in better income for farmers, thus validating the need for
private enterprises within the NGO efforts for rural development.
Morarka has found that, although handling of organic products is more complex,
there has been no constraint on farmers for transition to organic. Rather than
emphasizing yields and production, Mr. Gupta focuses on the investment to return ratio,
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which he has seen improve with organic farming. By partnering with the certification
agency OneCert, Morarka has been able to certify its farmers, speeding up the transition
from farm to retail. However, the company recognizes that the most difficult aspect of
marketing such goods is in the pricing, and finding a reasonable margin of return. As
Navin Kalra, the general manager of sales and marketing, pointed out, “the Indian
consumer, mainly consisting of housewives and servants, is willing to compromise on
health and quality if she would pay more otherwise.” 18 Realizing that pricing will always
be a bit higher for organic, Mr. Kalra stated the need for much higher customer
awareness. 19 It is this customer awareness that appears to be lacking throughout India,
and many of these NGOs are relying on mass media and growing incomes to create a
market. While the assumptions of such a market are not necessarily inaccurate, they are
not to be relied upon when dealing with millions of struggling livelihoods. Thus, it is
vital to examine the realities behind such a market, which will be looked at presently.

Gandhi Manav Kalyan Society
Another such NGO dealing with the duality of organic production and effective
marketing is the Gandhi Manav Kalyan Society (MKS), located in the village of Ogna
outside of Udaipur, Rajasthan. One main initiative of MKS is an organic farming
training and research center called Dharamitra. According to MKS, production has
doubled for farming incorporating organic farming techniques such as vermi-culture and
natural pesticides and manure. 20 In this particular region, the main issue has been water
management and so a particular emphasis is placed on low-water farming and well18
19
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building through the help of a UK based NGO called Wells for India. MKS has provided
the farmers with the initial organic inputs of seeds, earthworms, etc., which, according to
the founder, Madan Nagda, costs “a little less” than non-organic inputs. 21 With the
donation of these inputs as an initial investment, farmers throughout the Ogna region
have benefited, returning fertility to their soil, efficiently using water, and increasing their
income. As one family noted, increased production has allowed them to use more food
for personal consumption, as well as sell the rest at a higher price: with pesticides, one
kilogram of wheat sold for Rs 7 at the local marketplace, but those without pesticides
sold for Rs 10. 22 However, the direct link between pesticide use and price for the product
is uncertain, as market volatility and seasonability of certain products can be misleading.
Within MKS, there are plans to create a “farmers support network” through the name of
Dharamitra, which would entail branding organic products under the same name and
opening them up to the Udaipur market. 23
Currently, MKS sources minor amounts of grains to five star hotels in Udaipur,
where their wheat sells at about Rs 4 above market value. As well, MKS has the vision
to enter the export market because of the potential profitability of such a move. The main
obstacle to the growth of organic farming in Ogna, however, is the lack of certification.
The high cost of Rs. 50,000 for certification for one farmer or a group of five to ten is
simply too high for families in Ogna, even though certified organic wheat sells at about
Rs 10-12 about market value. 24
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As well, MKS, as do many other NGOs working in rural areas and relying on
predominantly rural marketplaces, has a vision for the future that is not reconciled with
the current market situation. Approximately 62% of the land within the region of the
wells project is currently non-irrigated, and thus if the project is successful in irrigating
all land, and assuming that land will have similar productive capacity, the amount of food
grown could double. MKS has done no formal study on the absorptive capacity of the
surrounding marketplace and the elasticity of demand for food. Without understanding
the ideal amount of food needed for the area, MKS is risking time and money in
encouraging all families to follow organic farming as a source of income.
MKS is convinced, however, that finding a market will not be a problem, as
international markets, as well as middle and high income Indian consumers, present
enormous potential. 25 Although international markets have extremely large returns when
accessed, this is not the focus of the present study, and so the domestic market will be
examined presently.

FAO Market Study 26
Several studies and market analyses have been conducted concerning the potential
for a domestic organic market in India. Most have been done by private corporations and
are thus difficult to access. However, the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the
United Nations (FAO) compiled a similar report based on several years of research and
surveys of the market for food in different levels of cities. According to the report, there
is “a growing concern for healthy and natural products,” as well as “preventive
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maintenance.” This increased awareness, as well as a large middle class of 300 million,
growing at a rate of 30-40 million a year, sets the stage for a tremendous opportunity.
According to the FAO, “given population figures, market potential estimates in the
coming ten years could beat the European markets matured over two decades.” They
estimate the total market potential at 2300 crore, with 1450 crore found in the top eight
metropolitan cities in the country. The top niche end of the food market is particularly
useful to observe, as this 2-5% of the food market has a value added of about Rs 1800
billion and has the highest capacity to spend more proportionally on food. However, it
appears that “price will be the lynchpin; volumes must be built up so that the price
decreases and market growth increases.” As several organic marketers have stated, the
Indian consumer is incredibly sensitive to price changes, and thus, recognizing the
difficulties in leveling the price with conventional goods, “educating the consumer seems
to be the single largest requirement” for the success of the movement towards organic.

Mandi System
It appears that there are varying degrees of awareness throughout the different
markets of India. In the local mandis, vendors focus mainly on appearance and feel of
the good rather than presence of chemicals. They are fully aware that wholesalers will
buy unripe fruit and use chemicals to ripen them quickly, or spray chemicals to improve
the shine. 27 The vendors are under the impression that these chemicals are harmless, and
one vendor mentioned that the only time people ask for chemical free goods is when they
have a particular allergy. 28 Generally, these vendors have seen the same price between
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organic and non-organic goods, and in fact find some organic foods more difficult to sell
because of a green or unripe appearance. As well, according to several vendors and
farmers in the Udaipur region, “everyone thinks that without chemical fertilizers and
pesticides, you can’t grow food,” thus eradicating the desire to invest in an organic
model. 29 However, consumers in the mandi acknowledge the health problems associated
with chemicals, but do not ask about it in the marketplace because to them, there seems to
be no presence of organic. Based on several informal conversations with average mandi
shoppers in Udaipur, they would be willing to pay Rs 10 more for products with an
organic certified stamp. However, they are not as willing to go to a supermarket or
hypermarket to find such goods, as they trust the quality less than their local vendor, and
find less variety. Also, most consumers feel that sufficient washing/boiling/steaming
removes harmful chemicals from the food, so it is not as important to buy organic. 30
Nevertheless, as several vendors mentioned, in the past four or five years, selling has
been good because the buying capacity of the average Indian has gone up, and more
people are paying attention to fruits and vegetables, especially those engaged in less and
less physical labor. Therefore, it is clear that even on an informal market level, there is a
chance to capture the increased spending capability of the consumer, especially that of
the middle and upper class, from which the mandi will eventually no longer be able to
benefit. This is due to the fact that buying food has a limit, as more and more food comes
with decreasing marginal utility, to the point where a person cannot consume more food
simply because he or she has more money. Therefore, the increase in income can be
spent on more expensive food, often better quality and often with better returns to the
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farmers. If companies and NGOs capture this excess income effectively, all ends of the
supply chain can have tremendous success.
While NGOs such as the Morarka Foundation and MKS have captured a glimpse
of this potential, they currently do not possess the marketing knowledge or the
infrastructure capability to efficiently seize this opportunity. I interviewed several
different organic food companies at varying scales, and will discuss their relevant
experiences presently.

Dubdengreen 31
Dubdengreen, based in New Delhi, is an organic company that has had tremendous
success selling organic certified and natural goods. Started by corporate executives
Jayashree and Ganesh Eashwar, they have a central store in a hidden corner of Shahpur
Jat, and source to several specialty stores in Delhi, as well as Bangalore, where they plan
on opening yet another store. The company began with their own organic farm outside of
Bangalore, but currently source from other farms for their own brand. Most unique about
Dubdengreen is the fact that they sell organic products of other brands from across the
country, emphasizing their dedication to the organic model rather than simple profit.
They recognized a demand for organic, stemming from looking after ecology, a visible
transition to health, and paying more attention to the health and future of one’s children.
In years past, as the Eashwars assert, “health foods had been for the unhealthy, but now
the healthy want healthy food as well.” By using word of mouth, media, and user
friendly showcasing Dubdengreen has increased organic awareness, as well as created a
successful company. However, it is clear that their self sacrifice in this project, including
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putting down the initial financial investment, is not a model that can be replicated on the
large scale. Their response to the issue of sustainable models for organic included
several points. First, they felt that “you need a variant- dedicated stores functioning on a
small outlet level, where there is trust in the people,” and these variants can be found
scattered throughout the country but have “not been brought under one umbrella
collaboration.” However, one large corporation cannot foster the sense of trust that small
units can, and the Eashwars claim that large companies in the food industry, such as
Reliance Fresh, will dilute the product and overall standards of organic goods. On the
other end of the spectrum, the organic sector has been predominantly an NGO activity
rather than a consumer oriented activity, yet “while NGOs have been good at maintaining
biodiversity, they have not been great at marketing.” As well, NGOs have had a different
concept of time, often holding a “frustrated western mentality” in a sector that needs time
to evolve and become more accessible.
The dominant issue with respect to accessibility concerns the certification
process, to which Dubdengreen has evolved its opinion. While fundamentally, the
Eashwars emphasize that “the onus is on us to make sure it’s organic,” they recognize the
growing consumer need to see a stamp on the packaging, substantiated by some third
party, be it government or private company. Although they state that certification costs
are becoming more rational as time passes, there are major logistical difficulties, such as
the fact that even the packaging must go through a certification process. Although their
goal is to have as much processing and packaging work done in rural areas, the need to
fulfill such standards cannot be reconciled with the inherent lack of training in many of
these areas. The administrative responsibilities of organic certification are also somewhat
31
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overwhelming for the average farming unit, and in order to maintain the detailed record
keeping involved, many groups have to hire a new broker in the process to keep the
records. This cost is frequently unmanageable. The certification process must be
simplified, and must also recognize those farmers in transition so that they do not lose
profit from the initial organic inputs. As well, it is important to clarify that, although
these goods are more expensive than the bulk of goods in India, which are unbranded,
organic certified products are inherently branded, and so relative to other branded
products, organic prices are extremely competitive. While the price of organic goods
does go down with time, “branded things are never for the lower class,” and so the desire
to expand organic certified products to all classes would be ignoring fundamental issues
of costs.
Mr. and Mrs. Eashwar affirmed that “no one knows what the offtake will be” for
organic, and shortages will inevitably occur, thus explaining the caution that many
companies are using in getting involved in the sector. However, they also feel that mass
replication is not the issue for their company, as Mr. Eashwar explains: “If I affect 10,000
people in my life, then that’s successful.” Dubdengreen is committed to their work and
the ideals exemplified in organic, and although this model may not change lives on a
macro scale, they provide a provocative example of the future of organic in the country.

Fabindia 32
Fabindia, based in New Delhi, began in the 1950s as an export business and
opened its first retail outlet in 1976 in Delhi, focusing on the craftsmanship of the desert
region, especially that of Rajasthan. Since then, Fabindia has become one of the most
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recognizable retail brands, and has expanded its range of products beyond textiles into
home accessories, natural body products, and organic food. The food initiative was
launched in July, 2004 as a continuation in the company’s model of environmentally and
socially sustainable practices. Mr. Jashwant Purohit, the head of business for organic
foods, explained that “craftsmen in Rajasthan are essentially farmers, and the Green
Revolution didn’t come out to that region, nor did MNCs (multinational corporations), so
natural farming is most common.” Therefore, it made sense for Fabindia to invest in
organic food in this region because of their existing relations with the craftsmen, and an
extremely aware customer base. The structure of Fabindia as an established company
that sells only within its own stores has been conducive to selling organic, as the
consumer sees a trusted certification stamp but does not see a cheaper conventional good
sitting next to it where price sensitivity would often come into play. Mr. Purohit
explained that companies such as Reliance would not find it lucrative to invest in organic,
as a supply chain at that scale is far too shaky, demand is uncertain, the industry is
scattered and there are no economies of scale. However, he also stated that “there is a
potential latent demand- if 1% of Delhi’s population consumed organic, Fabindia
wouldn’t be able to supply them.” Yet at this stage, Fabindia, according to Ashima
Agarwal of the organic foods business department, “must be the largest, in an organized
retail sense, seller of domestic organic,” reflecting a definite gap between potential
demand and current retail investment.
The structure of the organic model with Fabindia involves working with
cooperatives and companies rather than the farmers themselves. They only work on
marketing and retailing, leaving processing to the companies. They deal particularly in
32
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products that are not extremely common, and avoid produce because of the difficulties of
stocking it organically. They also recognize the importance of in-conversion
certification, and therefore have an “in-conversion” stamp as well as a “natural” stamp.
All procurement occurs in the Delhi facility, where there are weekly shipments to their 56
stores, which they are planning on expanding by 100 within the next year. Most of their
suppliers deal in bulk, and often in exports, so Fabindia is often an extremely small
buyer, creating issues of bringing the price down on the shelf. As both Ms. Agarwal and
Mr. Purohit emphasized, the Indian consumer is extremely sensitive to price, and there
are serious issues of economies of scale in organics. With certification costs being very
high, as well as scattered projects, small farms, lack of education, great distances, and
varying climactic zones, Fabindia will have a difficult time keeping prices low. Even
though, according to Mr. Purohit, the income is there for families to buy organic, the
Indian lifestyle is such that consumers are unwilling to invest in more expensive food due
to the fact that “servants, dogs, etc. eat the wheat flour and daal; it’s not for such personal
use as soap for instance.” This observation, as well as the home delivery system with
which branded companies cannot follow, creates a profound cultural obstacle to the
future of organic as it currently exists. Yet with the current customer base of Fabindia,
the organic food section is having success. In terms of mass replication, however, it is
unclear as to the reliability of a larger organic consumer population.

18

Pure Restaurant, Taj Hotel 33
In the northern section of Mumbai, the neighborhood of Bandra is famous for
housing and entertaining the most famous of Bollywood stars. The Taj Lands End Hotel
is located in this area, where the restaurant Pure is housed. Pure is described by Taj as
“India’s first international restaurant with a focus on organic ingredients.” Opened in
March 2006, the restaurant is the most extreme example of Taj’s attempts to incorporate
organic into its restaurants, an initiative rising from the demand of their predominantly
upper class international clientele. As Chef Anup Gupta, the executive sous chef of Pure
explained, the demand, along with the quality of the food and the desire to build the
company’s image turned organic into “a quest, and it is an exercise that we are trying to
do.” According to Chef Gupta, health and environmental sustainability were both
thoughts in making the transition, and in the Indian scenario, products are primarily
organic as it is, so price increases have not been as large as in the west. The farms that
source their products all have certification, and approximately 60% of their food is
domestically shipped; the dominant imported good is meat. People are becoming more
and more health conscious, as they gain awareness of genetically modified organisms,
chemical fertilizers and pesticides in their food. While it currently appears to be a
“fashion statement,” it is this awareness that signals that organic “has to hit the
mainstream.” While there certainly needs to be better norms, rules, and regulations, he
explains that “the moment you see there is a demand, the supply chain gets alerted. The
farmers, suppliers, and distributors will figure it out.” Thus, awareness is the key issue of
concern for creating a strong domestic market. As well, the focus should be primarily on
cities, as in rural areas, people are already leading a healthy life, even if there are not
33
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educated enough to be aware of such a reality. Proportional to the entire population,
there is only a small chunk of people who are not eating organic, and they are primarily
on a commercial level. Yet this section of consumer has incredible potential for the
organic market, and Chef Gupta does not hesitate to recommend that farmers go organic
because he has seen such success.
With respect to certification, Taj acknowledges the necessary involvement of a
body that is a constant source of inspection. This body can be government based or
private, but it must have credibility. Certification must be more accessible and cheaper,
and infrastructure must be improved to make the supply chain work faster, and this often
means incorporating less manpower. However, as food is the backbone of this society,
the presence of a strong agricultural sector will remain, and small scale farming will
continue to be the dominant structure, according to Chef Gupta. His confidence in such
statements reflects his conviction for the future of organic in India.

Reliance Fresh
Reliance Industries Ltd. is a Fortune 100 global company, whose dominance in
petroleum, petrochemicals, textiles and telecommunications has set the stage for it to be
one of the most powerful companies in the world. As Indian incomes have risen and
many sectors have become more formalized, Reliance, like many other large
corporations, has recognized the demand for a more organized retail sector. They
recently launched an entire retail initiative (with an initial investment of $750 million and
a total of $5.6 billion in coming years), which included the announcement of a food retail
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chain in June, 2006. 34 Since that time, approximately 150 stores have been opened under
the name, Reliance Fresh. 35 While they currently only have a presence in large cities and
have not in fact made a large dent in the food sector, they are symbolic of a transition to
formalized retail, a transition that could or could not revolutionize the way that trade goes
on throughout the country. After meeting with one employee and one senior member of
the company, it became clear that Reliance Fresh is equally fluid in their interpretation of
the future of the project. Currently, organized retail chains control only 3% of the
market, but with the impending entrance of companies such as Wal-Mart, it is clear that
Reliance’s presence in retail is not temporary. As the senior member acknowledged,
India is integrating with the world market, and thus demanding better quality products,
giving Reliance motivation to give a better product, especially in fruits and vegetables.
As 40% of food produced in the country is lost in waste (through transport, storage, and
inefficient marketplaces), there is an opportunity to use the efficiency of a company such
as Reliance and have a positive social impact through a business model. According to the
senior member, the Food Corporation of India (FCI), which handles surplus food and the
PDS, has a disastrous storage system, and people are dying as a result. As well, no one
has dealt with cold chain system issues, which should technically be the government’s
job, and antiquated farming methods do not allow for progress in efficiency and rapidity
of transactions. The Reliance Fresh model currently revolves around using the current
mandi system to source its fresh products, although there are certain instances of working
directly with the farmers, such as having collection centers in Rajasthan for procurement
purposes. The company does not have any intention of producing its own food on private
34
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21

farms as it does not want to get involved in such backward integration. However,
although it is currently just an ordinary retailer, Reliance does imagine setting up its own
private label with value added, but the details of this plan are still uncertain. Their
bottom line is to reach “the masses, not just the rich; we want to serve ordinary
consumers.” According to the senior member, Indian consumers are “the most value
conscious people...value as defined as price and quality.” They determine quality by
touch and feel, and do not really invest in understanding an appreciating “all these
stamps” of quality, organic content, etc. Large corporations, such as Reliance and WalMart, must recognize that “India is not branded,” and it has not been until recently, with
“Indian housewives now working and less time to shop, there is a slow movement
towards pre-packaged, branded goods.” Yet this transition has been extremely slow
relative to the population of the country. And as “India is 24 countries, you can’t have
just one strategy.”
In the state of Rajasthan, Mr. Prateek Tiwari, who handles the movement and
distribution of fruits and vegetables, explains one such strategy. 36 For the increasing
number of stores in Jaipur, as well as future outlets in Udaipur and Jodhpur, Mr. Tiwari
sources food in three ways. First, he goes directly to large farms and makes the
transaction directly. Second, he goes to the local mandi, where he deals with commission
agents between the farmer and himself, which is the dominant method of procurement for
the Reliance Fresh model as a whole. Third, there are several collection centers where
smaller farmers bring their food and receive payment upfront. These collection centers
serve as more than places of procurement, as they hold trainings for harvesting and
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production techniques. As well, the payment system is set up such that the managers
differentiate price to the farmer based on quality and thus the farmer develops a “quality
consciousness” that, according to many farmers, vendors, and organic companies, does
not exist at the mandis because there are set base prices. As Mr. Tiwari put it, there is “a
lot of handholding” involved in working with farmers at these centers. Once the product
is obtained, it is sent to a processing center in the city of Jaipur, where food is sorted,
allocated to different stores, and where surplus is stored. This warehouse aspect
emphasizes the efficiency in procurement that does not exist at the mandi level. Mr.
Tiwari explained that “no farmer in India has a weighing scale,” and so approximate
measurements are taken before leaving the farm. When arriving at the collection center,
Reliance’s weighing scale will measure above weight, but will take the excess,
understanding that the farmer cannot afford to bring the leftover produce to the local
mandi, either because of lack of transportation or because of missing peak hours at the
marketplace. Thus, this extra product is saved from waste.
Several farmers I spoke with at one particular collection center outside of Jaipur
explained other reasons for selling to Reliance rather than going top the local mandi. 37
First, they are able to save on packing materials, which are returned to them rather than
lost, which is what often occurs when spending all day at the local market. Second, less
time is spent dropping food off at the collection center than at the mandi, and more
produce is efficiently sold rather than stuck waiting in the frequent traffic line of trucks
waiting to get into the market. Third, there is often an illegal tax levied on farmers using
the mandi- the tax for this particular group of farmers was 4% of the total value of goods
brought to the market each day. However, Mr. Tiwari and the farmers both clarify that
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Reliance does not necessarily offer them the best price, but they offer a “better value
proposition,” where hidden costs such as lost time, middlemen cartels and resource waste
are lowered. The consistency of Reliance’s buying and investment in these rural areas
has created a strong sense of trust in the company on the part of the farmers. When asked
if they would go to a pharmacy set up by Reliance in the area, and if they will transfer all
of their selling to Reliance if possible, they replied by saying that “no one has gone into
our area and invested in it before- anything is better than what we have now.” There are
immense implications to this type of relationship, especially when there are possibilities
of Reliance selling chemical agri-inputs to the farmers at each collection center.
However, these implications could have positive effects if Reliance invests in organic
produce.
Currently, Reliance Fresh has not invested in organic products on any formal
level, but as the senior member pointed out, “organic is a goldmine.” 38 What is most
relevant in looking at the Reliance model is understanding the organized retail sector that
focuses on selling branded products, under which organic certified falls. While Reliance
certainly has the potential to revolutionize the sector, there are certain fundamental
obstacles that the Indian consumer presents which will limit any rapid change. The
service oriented nature of the small vendor, who will continue to do home deliveries and
sell food on credit is something which the middle class needs and the large corporate
model cannot provide. The common analysis that “Indians are extremely traditional, and
old habits die hard” reflects the reality that the pushcart/mandi model will continue to
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exist for some time. 39 Shrewdness in money, as well as a deeply entrenched system of
small scale farming, middlemen, and pushcart vendors will be a challenge for a new
branded model such as Reliance Fresh. Yet with investment in farm techniques, an
efficient supply chain, and an understanding of the Indian consumer, this company could
have an extremely large impact on the sector.
Although Reliance seems to have the most mass-replicable model for distribution
of food on a private business level, it is also prone to some of the worst problems
typically associated with corporate dominance. The dependency of farmers on the
company, mixed with a trust that would have them invest in whatever inputs they sold, as
well as the pushing out of wholesalers and vendors could streamline the system such that
significant amounts of labor could be lost, and Reliance could gain a monopoly.
Recently, a violent protest of about 1,000 vegetable sellers against three Reliance Fresh
stories in Ranchi reflects this growing problem. 40 This position of power would
inevitably give them the freedom to set prices, and so although the initial intention may
be to appeal to the average consumer, such dominance would allow them to manipulate
the market. Reliance Industries Ltd. is currently the source of 2.8% of India’s GDP 41 ,
and so they have an incredible stake in whatever industry they enter, and the Indian
government would likely be quick to support them. As well, it is clear that the current
choice of using mandis and small farmers as the main source of supply is not the long
term model, but they also state that privately growing food is not the goal either.
Therefore, it is likely that, with increasing influence, Reliance will move to working with
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larger farms, and this could lead to an increase in contract farming, which has proven to
be detrimental to the lives of many farming families. As the Andhra Pradesh Vision 2020
plan has made clear, “small landholdings are to be amalgamated and farmed under
intensive plantation style production for commercial seed and export markets, much of it
using GM crops, and are to replace small-scale family-based farming with the loss of an
estimated 20 million rural livelihoods.” 42 Thus, it is risky to say that the large scale
corporate model is the best way to pursue a branded system of retail. However, as seen
with NGOs such as Morarka and MKS, small companies such as Dubdengreen, and
specialty models such as Fabindia and Taj, the current system of organic certification will
likely not affect a very large population. As Mr. Eashwar of Dubdengreen pointed out,
this should not necessarily be the goal of pursuing a worthy cause, but it is one way of
viewing the long term sustainability and success of the organic model. 43

Certification/ Participatory Guarantee System 44
The FAO market study addresses the issue of such a branded certification process,
expressed as the third party system, which is not practiced by small farmers for the
reasons mentioned above: high fees, low literacy and education levels, administrative
difficulties, and large sized farming systems found in developed countries. According to
the study, “the third party system is stifling the organic movement; less than .5% of farms
in India are certified.” They propose a Participatory Guarantee System (PGS), which
would make certification easier and be much more farmer proactive. Rather than just
focus on the top niche end of the food market, the PGS would use a “mid mass-bottom
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up” or “mass organic movement” method, riding on the fact that 60-75% of agriculture in
the country is organic by default. This movement would incorporate a “mix of modern
retail trade and intervention of national and state agencies, with an active contingent of
farmer cooperatives and PGS groups.” The PGS would have to be backed by a foreign
company or government institution, and a trusted brand name would have to be
incorporated, based on the surveys taken for the study. However, this duality of a farmer
proactive system and involvement of deeply entrenched bureaucracy appears difficult to
achieve, especially in the Indian context. The study also suggests that organic retail be
focused on marketing to the top metropolitan cities, as “71.7% of fruits and 74.5% of
vegetables produced in the country are sold in the top ten cities.” Yet this emphasis
could establish a dichotomy that currently exists on an international scale between
developing countries that supply organic food and developed nations that source it. Thus,
the level of farmer activity must be maintained on more levels of the supply chain, and by
selling their own products in the same mandis from which they buy, there can be a better
integration of the market and a quicker development of economies of scale, over which
the farmers will have more power.
The bottom line of any such certification system is that rather than becoming a
centralized system of dominance, agriculture must be valued as an equal level sector and
thus the workers within it must be given fair access to benefits of the industry. As
Amartya Sen writes, “food production must generate entitlements,” and thus there must
be incentives for laborers to remain in agriculture, rather than be constrained to the sector
for lack of more lucrative work. 45 As Mr. Barah of the National Centre for Agricultural
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Economics and Policy Research put it “from the supply side perspective, agricultural
production must be remunerative; the farmer must either produce more or earn more.” 46
He also points out the dilemma of a certification system within a national structure that is
frequently burdened by problems: “If certification adds too much income, it’ll be
corrupted, and if too little, no one will listen.” While this is perhaps a somewhat negative
perspective on the opportunities inherent in creating such a system, it is important to keep
in mind when dealing with a country of one billion people and a sector that employs over
half of them.

Conclusion
Amongst the varying levels of the food industry, both public and private, there is an
ongoing battle between models, companies, and individuals. Throughout my interviews,
I heard about lies over contracts, gossip over bleak reliability of particular companies,
distrust of certifiers, dislike of NGOs, lack of competency in marketing, and
miscommunication between levels of even the same firm. While it made me question the
reliability of some of those with whom I spoke, I did not use these comments as a
legitimate excuse to invalidate any of the information I received. That being said, it is
quite clear that it is extremely difficult to find a common ground on the interpretation of
certain ideas or the ideal model for organic agriculture. I simply used this time as an
opportunity to survey the current initiatives, understand the obstacles that they face, and
observe the strengths that could be replicated on a larger scale in the future.
There are several common threads to keep in mind when approaching the
development of the organic food market in India. First, it is clear that farmers have some
46
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recognition of the effects of environmental degradation, and so they have not chosen to
use chemical inputs and GM seeds simply out of ignorance. However, as most farming
families have very little savings and rely on upfront cash, they place primary import on
finding a good price at the market. Because the local mandi is often inefficient, farmers
will likely be eager to get involved with an organization that invests directly in their
region, whether it be a corporation such as Reliance or and NGO such as MKS. If these
organizations provide tools for effective organic farming and a consistent buyer of the
goods, the farmers will be generally be proactive in making the transition. However,
because of bad infrastructure and information acquisition, such organization must be a
middleman or broker between farmer and buyer. While NGOs have been historically
been extremely competent at dealing with the farmer, they have lacked the marketing
skill, and thus there must be a partnership between public and private sectors. This
partnership must be limited, as too many brokers, or too many outsourced elements of the
supply chain creates bureaucratic problems and limits the profit maximization for the
farmer. There must be a dual role for agriculture in the rural setting: primarily, it must
serve as a source of food for the family, but there must be enough surplus to create an
income, as cooperative self-sufficiency no longer exists in an era of school fees,
electricity costs, and expensive marriage ceremonies.
From the demand side, it is apparent that there is some level of awareness by the
average consumer that there are harmful chemicals on the food that he or she eats, but the
incentive to look for organic is not yet strong enough, due to a number of factors. Most
of these factors can be ameliorated over time with the development of the sector (more
availability, affordable prices), but certain cultural norms pose obstacles for a traditional
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branded, third party certification system where the product is sold on a formal retail level.
Thus, options such as the PGS, better incorporation of the current pushcart vendor
structure, and more consumer awareness concerning organic food are important ideas to
be examined. Although price sensitivity is a constant concern, establishing economies of
scale and evolving the target consumer should allow for the sector to flourish. The most
vital issue then, is to return the highest margin possible to the farmer. The farmer can
then be given the choice of what to do with his or her life, rather than be stuck in a cycle
of unmarketable production and dependence on ineffective food aid. The farmer can then
be the drive behind an economy of change.
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